The paper examines a process of adapting a Norwegian cooperation model by the local industry in the Russian North. We found that the Russian way to build cooperation, far differently from the Norwegian practice, was characterized by intertwined personal and organizational ties, and by mixed political and business agendas. The empirical case was analyzed with help of a framework combining theories of social capital and Scandinavian institutionalism. On the base of this analysis, we challenge the established view of Russia as a country with low cooperation capacity and provide suggestions on how the Russian cooperation experience can be valuable in the West.
Weak legitimacy or absence of formal institutions still remains a key feature of the Russian business landscape, fostering dependence on informal institutions such as culture and ethics (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011) . In particular, Puffer and McCarthy argue that Russian managers tend to rely excessively on informal institutions such as personal networks to conduct business. At best, the international business and management literature views informal networks as a temporary solution for transitional economies. But this mechanism must decline for an economy to move towards an established Western-like market economy (Chakrabarty, 2009) . Analysed with help of theories and world views developed in the West, Russia with its networks tends to be understood in terms of inferiority, imbalance or deviation (see for example Crotty, 2006; Ledeneva, 1998 Ledeneva, , 2009 Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010; Rose, 1998) . This kind of approach is important for Western practitioners and policy makers who are supposed to cooperate with Russia, but it may limit the opportunity to learn from the Russian experience and extend existing theories of business and management.
1 This paper seeks to contribute to the latter and, in doing so, presents the results of an empirical study of the adoption of a Western cooperation model in Russia. In this case, personal relationships and informal networks played a key role.
The empirical study was implemented in the Murmansk region of the North-West Federal District of Russia. This region is the closest to the giant gas field Shtokman, located on the Russian side of the Barents Sea shelf. Responding to the government's plans to develop Shtokman, in the second half of the 2000s, local companies in Murmansk mobilized in a regional supply industry association. The idea of this association was brought to Russia by Norwegian oil major Statoil, which used a Norwegian industry association as a prototype example for Russia. The local actors in Murmansk played an active role in the association project. Though started with support from Norway, with time this project became self-sufficient and driven by Russian actors in a way quite different from the Norwegian practice. Hence, a project initiated by Norway became a Russian project. An umbrella research problem for this study is to understand the following:
How do Russian actors make a project initiated by Norway a Russian project?
Our analytical approach to the research problem combines elaborations of Scandinavian institutionalism and theory of social capital. Scandinavian institutionalism highlights organizational variation and distinctiveness rather than the isomorphism and standardization manifested by mainstream institutional theory (Boxenbaum & Strangaard Pedersen, 2009) . A particular value of this approach for organizational studies is its processual, prejudice-free view on organizing, in contrast to a traditional, structure-oriented view of organization or organizational field (see e.g. Czarniawska, 2008, pp. 6-7) . Thus, our unit of analysis is an organizing process associated with the implementation of a Norwegian project by Russian actors. Regarding social capital, this concept generally refers to the ability of people to work together in groups and organizations for a common purpose (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 10) . A core idea of the social capital theory is that social relationships have value (Putnam, 2000, p. 19) . Social capital is assumed to be a critical issue for understanding differences between OECD countries and developing countries (including transitional economies and Russia). This paper is positioned in the East-West literature on Russia with a twofold contribution. First, our findings suggest that weak formal networks of social capital in Russia present not only challenges but also opportunities for innovative cooperation projects. In this respect, informal networks have a degree of freedom (which is rather absent in the West) to interpret their roles and formalize their relationships and can be used in a dynamic and creative way. This finding challenges the established view of Russia as a society with low cooperative capacity. In addition, we argue that the cooperation experience of Russia can be of value to Western economies. If formal organization in the West comes to a critical 2 Refer to, for example, the Social Development Department of the World Bank, which has supported two significant research initiatives to understand, measure and assess the impact of social capital. Both the Social Capital Initiative and the Local Level Institutions Study supported community-focused research in developing countries (Source: World Bank).
point, its repair might require the mobilization of social capital resources in a way similar to what we found in our Russian case.
Before presenting and discussing these findings in more detail, we introduce the reader to our analytical framework, the empirical context and the research methodology used to link our analysis and the data together.
Towards an analytical framework

Social capital
Social capital is concerned with the structure and influence of relationships with and between individuals, organizations and societies (Andriessen & Gubbins, 2009 ). The concept of social capital has become increasingly popular in a wide range of social science disciplines as it has proved to be a powerful factor explaining actors' relative success in conducting social affairs and gaining access to critical resources (see e.g. Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 17 ). Here we focus on two central typologies of the social capital literature which capture important differences between the Western and Russian business landscape. After that, we review the previous literature on social capital in Russia using these two typologies.
Bridging and bonding social capital
According to Putnam (2000) , of all the dimensions along which forms of social capital vary, perhaps the most important is the distinction between bridging (or inclusive) and bonding (or exclusive):
Some forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, inward looking and then reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups...Other networks are outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages. (ibid, p. 22) Further, Putnam argues that bonding social capital is good for undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity in a group (good for getting by), while bridging networks are better for linking to external assets and for diffusing information (good for getting ahead).
Although both bonding and bridging social capital can serve as background for collective action, they assume different ways of engagement at the level of the individual. In the case of inward-looking (bonding) capital, a special role is played by "a certain set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permit cooperation among them" (Fukuyama, 1997) . This means that users of bonding capital should be ready to underplay individual goals if they do not match those goals associated with the values and norms accepted in the group. Outward-looking (bridging) capital can be associated with the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition (Bourdieu, 1986) . In this view, users of bridging capital should be ready to tolerate the identities of multiple other actors to get access to the valuable resources they possess.
At the collective level, differences between bonding and bridging social capital can be associated with differences between closure and openness of the network structure. As noted by Gargulio and Benasi (2000) , the traditional view of social capital stresses the positive effects of network closure-the presence of cohesive ties-in promoting a normative environment that facilitates trust and cooperation between actors (Coleman, 1988 (Coleman, , 1990 , while structural hole theory (Burt, 1992 (Burt, , 1997 argues that the benefits from social capital stem from the brokerage opportunities created by disperse ties in networks rich with structural holes-that is, by the lack of network closure.
Formal and informal networks of social capital
Another typology relates to formal and informal social capital networks that individuals use to produce or allocate goods and services (Rose, 1998) . According to Rose, social networks of an informal nature are face-to-face relationships between a limited number of individuals who know each other and are bound together by kinship, friendship and propinquity; networks of a formal nature are relationships between people as members of formal organizations. Interactions in formal networks are bound by impersonal rules like laws or a corporate code of conduct. Building upon Coleman's (1990) framework, Rose proposes a situational view of social capital: an individual relies on a heterogeneous set of social capital networks (formal, informal or both), depending on the incentives and constraints affecting how things can get done in a given situation. This approach is interesting because it aims at understanding how social capital comes into play when people are confronted with practical issues in specific situations. Will they act through formal or informal networks?
Social capital in Russia
It was foreseeable that the social capital discussion, originating in the West, would move to the countries in the East, of course including Russia-a country of the "hundred friends" and connections (Hayoz & Sergeyev, 2003) . As far as West-oriented research on social capital was looking at how social networks can create value, the research on Russia and other postcommunist countries contributed to an understanding of the rather negative sides of social capital (e.g. Crotty, 2006; Ledeneva, 1998; Rose, 1998) . According to Vedantam's 3 interview with political scientist Robert Putnam, the social capital guru, top-down models of governance and resource allocation run counter to everything known about how social capital grows (Amsterdam, 2007) . Note that in fairness, there are also a few studies offering rather optimistic views of social capital in Russian regions (Marsh, 2000; Petro, 2001) , political networks (Hayoz & Sergeyev, 2003) and networks of entrepreneurs (Batjargal, 2003) . In any case, the extant studies are helpful in describing Russia in terms of bridging-bonding and formal-informal typologies of social capital.
By applying Rose's (1995) Hourglass Society model to study the environmental movement and civil society development in Russia, Crotty (2006) shows that preexisting ties allow various groups of Russian actors to generate both bridging and bonding social capital. The problem is that the capital is not directed to development of the civil space linking the interests of elites and ordinary citizens.
Situated in either part of the "hourglass", these two groups remain separated. A clear warning of 3 Shankar Vedantam is a science correspondent for NPR, a multimedia news organization and radio program producer (the interview is retrieved from http://www.npr.org/people/137765146/shankar-vedantam).
Crotty's paper is that preexisting social ties can result in the rise of inward-looking interest groups in Russia's third sector, pursuing self-interested behaviour under the banner of democratic ideas. Such inward-looking groups tend to preserve their stocks of social capital, and in the words of Adler and Kwon (2002) , the "ties that bind become the ties that blind". Such behaviour is counterproductive to bridging the elite and non-elite groupings and therefore limits development of broader cooperation through third-party organizations.
Overreliance on bonding capital and the limited capacity of bridging capital in Russia also follows from research conceptualizing social capital in terms of trust in others. This type of conceptualization is shared by leading scholars from various disciplines (see review by Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011) . As noted by Delhey and colleagues, scholars usually distinguish between two forms of trust in others: particular trust (also called thick, or specific) involves a narrow circle of familiar others;
general trust (also called thin, or generalist) concerns a wider circle of unfamiliar others. While particular trust is associated with bonding social capital, general trust refers to its bridging component.
In modern society, which involves daily interactions with strangers, general trust is thought to be more important than particular trust (ibid., p. 786). In terms of general trust, Russia along with other postcommunist countries is characterized as a low-trust society (Hayoz & Sergeyev, 2003) , a country with trust as a missing resource (Sztompka, 1995) or with low radius of trust (Delhey, et al., 2011 ) and a country with a lack of minimal trust (Humphrey & Schmitz, 1998) .
Furthermore, while Russia is associated with a potential contradiction between informal and formal networks (Ledeneva, 1998 (Ledeneva, , 2009 , it is argued that life and the economy in Western countries rest upon a proper balance between formal rules (reinforced by formal organizations) and institutionalized norms of behaviour (manifested in informal rules) for interpersonal interactions (North, 1990, p. 36 cited in Rose 1998). Nationwide reliance on personal or informal networks of social capital has been reported by Rose (1998) 
Scandinavian institutionalism
The institutionalist literature that has emerged and developed within Scandinavia is perhaps best described as being concerned with how organizational actors respond to institutional pressure in their everyday practice (Boxenbaum & Strangaard Pedersen, 2009 ). This view is different from prevailing institutional theory of organization, which often focuses on the structuration of organizational fields and regards institutions as norms of stability being either antecedents (old institutionalism) or results (new institutionalism) of organizational action (see Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996, pp. 3-5) . To Scandinavian institutionalists, new organizational practices emerge from a blend of the actors' intentions and activities associated with institutionalized ideas travelling in time and space. This kind of change is neither planned in advance (as new institutionalism would suggest) nor a result of adapting to institutions taken for granted (as old institutionalism would suggest). Rather, the ideas continuously come into play and can be reflexively addressed by the participating actors to resolve their issues in the situation at hand.
Translation
As noted by Ritvala and Granqvist (2009) , Scandinavian institutionalists, by drawing on the notion of translation (Latour, 1986) , have produced detailed narratives on adaptations of foreign ideas and institutions to local contexts (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005; Lindberg & Czarniawska, 2006) . The concept of translation refers to the notion that ideas change when they travel from one institutional context to another (Boxenbaum & Strangaard Pedersen, 2009 ). The translation model stresses the importance of friction as the interactive clash between ideas in residence and incoming ideas, leading to the transformation of both (Czarniawska, 2008, p. 88) . In this view, friction is a positive element, as actors give new energy to ideas by interactively changing them according to their own frame of reference (ibid.).
A process of translation often happens through imitating others (Hedmo, Sahlin-Andersson, & Wedlin, 2005) . This happens because actors (people, groups, organizations, cities, even countries) tend to imitate those they want to resemble, or, in other words, that they consider successful. As noted by
Hedmo and colleagues, the results of imitation may be quite different from the imitated model because what is being transferred from one setting to another is not an idea or a practice as such but rather accounts and materializations of a certain idea or practice (p. 195). These accounts and materializations are made by subjective actors in contexts different from the original ones. In the view of Scandinavian institutionalists, this kind of work can be understood as innovation as it is always complemented by unintended consequences and unique solutions. Actors participating in this work, often both the imitators and the imitated ones, are called editors (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996) . According to Sahlin-Andersson, editors are purposeful actors contributing to the local implementation of the ideas and working to decouple old and new models by applying them to different situations.
Focusing on the work of editors is a promising approach to understanding how Western ideas are translated into the Russian context. For the sake of this research, we are interested in understanding whether and how social capital becomes a part of their work.
Analytical framework
Our analytical framework (figure 1) is designed to investigate translation of a foreign cooperation Murmansk has traditionally been an export-oriented region with an economy based on the rich natural resources of the Kola Peninsula and the Barents Sea. The primary exports of the region are nonferrous metals, mineral raw materials and food products (mostly fish) and agricultural products. The 
New prospects and challenges
Since the early 2000s, the Russian government has planned the development of the giant Shtokman gas field, located in the Barents Sea. 5 Murmansk-based companies were then ambivalent. They were glad for new business opportunities coming to their area, but at the same time, they were afraid of competition with more experienced and larger suppliers from outside. Most of the local companies operating in the regional market had no experience participating in such complex projects as 
Regional association: A Norwegian model to Russia
The overall goal of Statoil's initiative in Murmansk was to assist local companies on their way to becoming qualified suppliers 7 of products and services related to the development of the offshore projects. In particular, Statoil wanted to assist small and medium business enterprises to improve their competence and not least to protect their rights and common interests. 6 After the merger of Statoil and the Oil and Gas Division of Norsk Hydro in 2007, StatoilHydro was the name of the joint company until fall 2009. Since then the name has been changed to Statoil (source: Statoil). Norsk Hydro also competed for a share in the Shtokman project and prior to the merger with Statoil had its own cooperation program with the Russian industry. 7 The petroleum production industry has many levels ranging from petroleum companies and their main contractors down to various suppliers-subcontractors supplying products and services to both the offshore and onshore part of a project.
The development of such third-party organizations as Petro Arctic in the north can be seen as a natural continuation of the development of the Norwegian continental shelf already started in its southern part in the 1970s-1990s. This development has proceeded through dialogue between multiple groups, such as central and regional authorities, foreign and domestic businesses and local SMEs. Regarding the Murmansk region, in the early 2000s, it had no third-party organization ready to direct the whole mass of the local companies towards larger projects. However, as reported by Kamayeva (2000) , two NGOs for business had existed there since early 1990s. They assisted their members in the search for business partners and established links between member companies.
Soon after the formal establishment of the Association in 2006, around 60 local companies became members. The framework conditions of the Association were in many ways dependent on changes in the Russian oil and gas regimes related to strategic projects like Shtokman (Mineev, 2011, pp. 313-317 
Research approach, data collection and analysis
Approach
The study applies a qualitative research approach. With qualitative methodology comes an acknowledgment that the field itself is not just part of the empirical world but is shaped by the theoretical interests of the researcher (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006, p. 820) . This means that to understand social reality, which is emergent, subjectively created, and objectified through human interaction (Chua, 1986, p. 615) , a researcher needs to develop an interpretation, or a way of knowing the field. The interpretation is not pre-given. The practice of doing qualitative studies involves an ongoing reflection on the data and its positioning against different theories such that the data can contribute to and develop further the chosen research questions (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006) . In our case, data collection was not guided by any specific theory but focused on interactions of various actors involved in the implementation of the Norwegian model in Russia. Our theoretical research question to analyse activities of the Russian actors by combining Scandinavian institutional theory with theory of social capital came as a result of an ongoing reflection on the rich data we collected.
This kind of approach can be qualified as reflexive interpretation (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p. 271) , meaning that one mode of thought is continuously confronted by another. In this fashion, various theoretical perspectives were compared with each other and with the data coming from the empirical setting of the Murmansk industry. The state of knowing the field changed as the theories were considered and discarded on the way towards the analytical framework presented in section 2. Some additional data were collected afterwards to better illustrate concepts included in the framework.
Data collection
Access 
Data analysis
The obtained data were analysed in the following way. First, we constructed a historical account of the Association and identified key actors involved in its development from both the Norwegian and the Russian side. The history was divided in three phases: 
Self-sufficiency dilemma:
Ready-made or own solution?
Cooperative activities
Mobilizing local stakeholders
Building strategic consortia
Integrating with external stakeholders
Further analysis of the data focused on the question of how the Russian actors elaborated pragmatic solutions to facilitate cooperation. The pragmatic solutions were analysed in terms of two relational activities: obtaining cohesiveness and managing diversity. The former is associated with bonding social capital, while the latter is about bridging social capital. These two types of activities were examined in relation to each friction point and then assessed with view of acting through both formal and informal (social capital) networks. A more detailed account of our findings is provided in the next section.
Findings: How do Russian actors make a project initiated by Norway a
Russian project?
Friction point 1: The interpretation dilemma
The Statoil's decision to give the Russian partners "free hand" in developing the Association was important for getting local support for the project. However, it created a sort of enigma for the Russian side. Such projects in Norway normally assume cooperation between various groups, such as regional government, small and medium-sized companies and larger companies of different types, as well as companies from outside the region. Often this involves international cooperation. Such diversity is probably related to the complexity of oil and gas projects. Naturally, planning the Association involved many groups in Murmansk too. But then some disagreements took place. For most of the local actors, such a project was unfamiliar, and they lacked experience in this kind of cooperation.
Unique broker
Some disagreements took place among the regional administration officials. They saw differently the opportunities and challenges the Association could bring. While some people were sceptical of cooperation with a large Western company (as it pursued its own interests), others saw this as a potential source of regional income. In addition, it was unclear how to organize cooperation with business. The Association director played a key role as a broker. He personally met and negotiated with all the involved parties to resolve the issues. He kept explaining that the Association was a Russian project crucial for the development of the Murmansk region. As he described this himself:
In the beginning it was difficult to explain to people that it was a Russian association for business, not a Norwegian one. The last argument was used by some oppositionists to show that the project was not valuable for Russia. Also, they suggested not including foreign companies as members.
I, with all my weight, personally negotiated with decision makers and refuted the oppositionists. . . . In the development of the Association, it was important to maintain transparency and publicity.
The director's negotiation work was supported by the leader of the Association working group:
The governor was positive to Statoil's offer and signed the memorandum of understanding, but when practical work started, some problems occurred. . . . Then suggestions for concrete actions originated from below. . . . When concrete persons and last names appeared in the action plans, there were some tensions at the level of top officials. . . . I had to explain to people that we should have been active but not wait for sponsorships and actions from Statoil. This was hard to understand for some high officials. Maybe it is our old habit, izhdivenchestvo-they [Statoil] need [it] , and they will do it. . . . So negotiating work was done in the corridors of power to save the idea and put it on the right track. 
Local patriotism
The local companies perceived the Association as an opportunity to protect their interest against larger and more experienced companies from outside. It seems that this shared fear was also an important factor motivating them for cohesive cooperation:
The association and its consortia are for local companies to defend their region. (Director of a small construction engineering company, member of the Association)
It was a good idea to join forces with local companies. For us it was a chance to ensure that money does not pass by Murmansk companies. . . . We do not want to be just small workers for bigger firms from outside Russia. (Director of another small construction engineering company, member of the Association)
We can see that the reaction of the local companies to new, upcoming projects is that they unite in groups, including the Association and its consortia. (Director of the Association)
The fear of external newcomers was not without reason. As the Association director indicated in the interview, he had to dispute with representatives of a Gazprom structure company related to Shtokman:
They came to Murmansk and directly met some local companies. Clearly, this created a lot of trouble here. . . . I had to meet them and ask them to stop doing so. (Director of the Association)
As he further explained, this kind of direct selection would create unfavourable conditions for local subcontractors since they were too small and separated. At the same time, the process was not transparent to others. Thus, for outsiders the Association was positioned as an entrance door to the local market. As for local companies, the Association made them more conscious about their shared identity with the Murmansk region.
Friction point 2: The self-sufficiency dilemma
When Statoil started to lessen its methodical and financial involvement, the Russian partners had to find methods for the self-sufficient development of the Association. The members then started to implement their own entrepreneurial initiatives, using the Association as a platform. One of the activities was a consortium (hereafter the Consortium), which was founded in In 2010 Statoil stopped financing the Association and became an ordinary member. Although the membership fees were raised, most of the members did not leave the Association. The Consortium was not the only initiative of the Association, but it played an important role in securing selfsufficiency of the Association for its local members. In the rest of this section we therefore focus our attention on the Consortium.
Soviet pride and friendship networks
By 2010 The strategic decisions (for example, participation in a tender) were made by the Council, and then they were distributed down to the member companies. None of the ordinary members interviewed indicated feelings of oppression from being limited in their rights. It seems that the ordinary members trusted the board, and the board could rely on the ordinary members:
The board companies are making decisions; they stand for their subcontractors. Otherwise, if 40 people participate in the meeting, it would be like a bazaar, but not decision making.
(Director B)
The Consortium was more a network of persons than one of organizations. But these persons addressed each other as strong leaders, able to mobilize their organizations. Director B commented in this respect:
If we [directors] manage to come to an agreement with one another, then we would be able to secure cooperation between the employees of our companies.
We can always sit down and talk together. . . . Surely we will come to an agreement about how to share a project.
The next quote illustrates the importance of personal ties, a shared feeling of local patriotism and a sort of nostalgia about the past:
Young businessmen think in different categories than we do: they want to conquer the market. But we want to develop our region. . . . We will cooperate with a young newcomer if, for example, he comes to us and says that he helps his father or uncle, who has vast It seems that personal ties, even friendship, were an important element binding the Consortium leaders together. They knew one another quite well, and this was important for their willingness to share risks and join resources in new projects:
We meet regularly on different occasions and share information. . . . We have all known each other for many years, and we are specialists; at the same time, we are leaders of the companies and friends taking responsibility for each other.
However, some fear and appreciation of internal competition were also evident in the interviews:
We still do not know exactly if we would have to share or compete . . . but if we compete, we would like to do it in a civilized way. (Director C) In this setting everybody was known and visible and could check on everybody else. In such transparent conditions, it is rational to be cooperative. For example, Director B mentioned in an interview:
The Murmansk and Kola region is a small place with only one road coming in. . . . Once anybody enters it, we know all about what happens to him. . . . You can cheat only once. . . . People understand that it is much better to be a good player and take responsibility.
Being unsure of the market situation but believing in personal relations, the Consortium members attempted to create an informal and friendly atmosphere of trust. This seemed to be a favourable condition for relatively fast decision making. However, not everybody but only well-known and highesteemed individuals could be included in the cooperation. Less well-known people were not excluded, but the Consortium board decided to give newcomers trial orders-small construction works to see whether they could be later trusted for larger works, where many parties can be dependent on In addition, this informant mentioned that he had two brothers who also worked in the construction industry in Murmansk, but they did not cooperate (although to him this would have been natural). Thus, the role of the Consortium in the development of the whole region was a bit questionable. On the one hand, it positioned itself as a regional actor and enjoyed political and informational support from the authorities. On the other hand, some companies
were not a part of the preparation for the large projects coming into region. The Consortium was a strong network of influential people, but at the same time, it was not completely open for everybody.
Putting business and politics together
The director 
10
By then the Consortium Council was planning to establish a joint company, "little SDAG," as they themselves characterized it, meaning that it would be a project management company. The Association board approved this decision, and it was decided that the Association would be one of the founders of the new company. 11 At the same time, several representatives of the Consortium Council, including the directors of the largest construction company (the lead company for joint projects), were elected onto the board of the Association. A representative of the local office of SDAG (deputy) was also invited to join the board of the Association. Figure 2 illustrates that the Association network was 10 This figure is made as a result of the analysis of press releases of the Association, reports from the board and member meetings, and news published on the Association's website. 11 Later on, after this research was implemented, the joint company was established, but we did not follow its development and ownership structure. We assume it could be subject to changes while the company was materialized, but the Shtokman project was subject to changes and postponement. Here we exemplify only how the Russian actors mobilized their relationships when they addressed the challenge to develop a self-sufficient cooperation.
put together by means of both formal organizational and formal personal ties. While the main broker in this cooperation was, of course, the dedicated director of the Association, several other persons can be characterized as mediators. The mediators represented other organizations, such as the local government, parliament and SDAG, in the board of the Association. Local company actors-directors of nine founding Consortium companies-were integrated into this network. The network structure included both political and business actors and to some extent mixed them up (for example, through the board of the Association). The network presented in figure 2 should not be regarded as a fixed structure, as the Association was still an ongoing project. Rather, figure 2 should be viewed as a snapshot of the Association when it was concerned with the self-sufficiency dilemma. 
Summary of the findings
The findings are summarized in figure 3 . The development of the Association proceeded through work around two friction points: the interpretation dilemma and the self-sufficiency dilemma. At each of these points, the Russian actors had to address two relational problems: managing diversity and obtaining cohesiveness. The first problem is associated with bridging social capital, while the second one is about bonding social capital. Diversity of interests and opinions around the interpretation dilemma was managed by the unique broker. Later on, when dealing with the self-sufficiency dilemma, diversity was managed via new organizational forms (such as the Consortium and board of the Association) which connected both political and business actors. Cohesiveness of cooperative action was achieved through shared local patriotism when dealing with the interpretation dilemma, and through shared identity through the Soviet past and friendship networks. Organizational and interpersonal relationships in the Association had been intertwined since the very beginning (due to strong previous ties) and became even more diffuse when organizational structures around the Association were formalized but still depended on interpersonal relations. This interaction helped the Russian actors to both manage diversity and obtain cohesiveness, but at the same time, we can observe signs of a closed network structure.
Discussion
The Norway, a country successful in solving similar issues. Sometimes the lack of a formal institutional framework was compensated for by personal relationships. Then, inspiration came from culturalcognitive institutions (Scott 2008, 56-59) such as values of friendship (particularistic reciprocity) and a shared identity of the Soviet past.
A potential theoretical contribution of this paper is related to viewing social capital as an integrative part of editing work or, more generally, an organizing process. This is different from the mainstream literature in the field of organization. There, most of the studies are interested in measuring the level of social capital and its effects on organizational performance (see for example Leana and Pil 2006) . A specific condition of our research is that social capital is rather an analytical layer (to describe editing) than an empirical object open for measurement. This approach allows an understanding of how people look for unique solutions rather than follow norms of appropriateness logics (March and Olsen 2004) -"what a person like me would do in a situation like that." Such appropriateness in contemporary Russia, in Rose's (1998) terms, would be to turn to anti-modern behaviour and bend formal organization while coping with standard life situations. In contrast, looking at an unknown situation associated with institutional conflicts and dilemmas, our study highlighted the ability of the Russian actors to innovate and build platform for cooperation in new industrial projects.
Conclusions
The general purpose of this paper was to explore how Russian actors made a project initiated by
Norway a Russian project. Although Norway and Russia are neighbours geographically, they have a long institutional distance (Dikova 2012) in between, as Western economies and transitional economies typically do. In this respect, this paper highlights how fundamental differences between
West and East are managed in practice. Seen through the action-oriented perspective of Scandinavian institutionalism, the implementation of the Norwegian model in Russia was about managing frictions between institutions attached to the model and the local institutions in Russia. The institutional differences were conceptualized with help of theory of social capital.
Our findings offer new insight to the literature claiming that personal networks and pre-existing ties play a crucial role in cooperation processes in Russia (Puffer and McCarthy 2011; Crotty 2006; Ledeneva 2009; Rose 1998; Hayoz and Sergeyev 2003; Puffer, McCarthy, and Boisot 2010) . While pre-existing ties and groups of bonding social capital were seen by Crotty (2006) as a reason for failure of third-party organizations, our case highlighted a third-party project (The Association) successfully bridging various groups, although lack of initial bridging ties and formal social capital networks was compensated by pre-existing ties and personal networks. It looks like more concrete business issues, such as preparation for an industrial project as in our case, may provide a more conducive ground for organizing bridging activities in Russia than rather abstract ideas of civicness such as environmentalism as in Crotty's case. Furthermore, as suggested by Ledeneva (2009) , in the long run, informal tactics compromise the chance of reaching strategic goals of modernization in Russia because they among other things undermine the fundamental principle of separation of powers.
In our study, the Association became a place where the power of various actors was consolidated in one effort. However, such a consolidation was important as it constituted a regional bottom-up initiative.
Our study provides a twofold contribution in response to the call from Puffer and McCarthy (2011) for further development of both a theory of Russian management and a Russian theory of management.
The first part of the call is about new ways to understand Russia. Here we have demonstrated that
Russian actors have cooperative capacity in spite of short supply of bridging social capital and weak formal networks. This capacity is associated with networks of bonding social capital, which becomes a resource when consciously addressed by the participants. To formalize their relationships, Russian actors can utilize a degree of freedom which is absent in the West (due to highly institutionalized relationships). While in our Russian case cohesiveness of action and access to diverse resources was achieved though mixing business and politics, in the West there is no legitimate room for such cooperation. The second part of the call has to do with learning from the Russian experience.
Overreliance on bridging social capital and formal organizations in the West can be unfavourable. In today's growing complexity of formal organization, particularistic trust, associated with bonding social capital, is diminishing. However, if formal organization comes to a critical point, its repair will require cohesive action associated with higher risks, responsibilities and interventions. In this case the experience of Russia is valuable. There, when faced with critical issues, groups of bonding capital can be centers for more responsibility and collective action.
We see further potential of action-oriented studies of social capital both outside and inside Russia. At present, the whole Arctic is considered a future resource base where local communities experience pressure from the extractive industry. In this respect we invite more studies of rural contexts under external pressure. Another research opportunity would be to explore in more detail how the Soviet administrative heritage is manifested in management and business practices of contemporary Russia.
